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The default mode network (DMN) of the brain consists of areas that are typically more
active during rest than during active task performance. Recently however, this network
has been shown to be activated by certain types of tasks. Social cognition, particularly
higher-order tasks such as attributing mental states to others, has been suggested to
activate a network of areas at least partly overlapping with the DMN. Here, we explore this
claim, drawing on evidence from meta-analyses of functional MRI data and recent studies
investigating the structural and functional connectivity of the social brain. In addition, we
discuss recent evidence for the existence of a DMN in non-human primates. We conclude
by discussing some of the implications of these observations.
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DEFAULT MODE OR SOCIAL BRAIN?
When human participants are not engaged in any specific task
a set of brain regions can be observed to be active (Shulman
et al., 1997). Collectively this set of regions is now commonly
referred to as the “default mode network” (DMN; Raichle et al.,
2001; Buckner et al., 2008). Regions of the DMN often show a
deactivation when participants perform cognitive tasks and this
degree of deactivation can be predictive of subsequent perfor-
mance (Eichele et al., 2008). Contributing to its popularity, the
DMN is easy to identify in resting state functional MRI data and
its integrity seems to be compromised in a number of neuro-
logical and psychiatric syndromes, such as Alzheimer’s disease
(Hafkemeijer et al., 2012) and autism (Anderson et al., 2011).
It is now becoming increasingly apparent that brain areas
associated with the DMN are activated during the performance
of certain types of tasks. Indeed, the proposed anti-correlation
between the DMN and task-related networks has been called into
question (Murphy et al., 2009; Kelly et al., 2012). In this paper, we
will focus on one of the task domains that has been suggested to
activate the DMN, that of social cognition. It has been observed
that there is strong overlap between the network of areas activated
in social cognition and the DMN (Corbetta et al., 2008; Schilbach
et al., 2008), but further systematic investigation has been lacking.
We will explore the hypothesis that areas in the DMN are involved
in certain types of social cognition, speculate on why this might
be the case, and explore its implications for understanding social
cognition not just in humans, but also in non-human primates.
Importantly, in this paper we attempt to take this discus-
sion further by reviewing some recent anatomical data on the
DMN and areas involved in social cognition, since a better
understanding of the underlying anatomy is vital to understand-
ing a brain network’s function. Second, we discuss recent data
on the anatomical relation between the DMN and social cog-
nition networks in non-human primates providing independent
evidence for a degree of overlap between DMN and brain areas
mediating social cognition. We conclude by proposing some
hypotheses on why certain aspects of social cognition might rely
on the DMN and the consequences of this finding.
THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
The history of research into the DMN is described in detail
by a number of papers (Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner
et al., 2008), so we will only provide a brief overview here. The
DMN was originally identified in block-design positron emission
tomography (PET) studies by looking at brain areas that showed
activity increases during passive or “rest” blocks compared to
“task” blocks (Shulman et al., 1997). Following a series of influ-
ential papers by Raichle and colleagues, the DMN emerged as its
own area of research (Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001).
These papers argued that the DMN identified by task-negative
contrasts is a specific anatomical network, distinguishable from
task-negative effects in unattended sensory modalities related to
attention (Haxby et al., 1994).
More recently, the DMN is often identified in pure “rest-
ing state” experiments. In this type of paradigm, participants’
brain activity is recorded while participants are not performing
any task and are usually left undirected to think for themselves.
By extracting the time course in a region of interest and corre-
lating that with brain activity at each voxel, one can obtain a
map of functional interactions between brain areas during rest.
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Seeding, for instance, the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) results
in a map of DMN (Greicius et al., 2002). Alternatively, the data
can be analyzed using model-free analysis techniques such as
independent component analysis (ICA), which allow one to char-
acterize the spatio-temporal structure of the data (Beckmann
et al., 2005). This results in a number of independent com-
ponents, each reflecting a distinct network of interacting brain
regions, in which the DMN is often captured in a single, or very
few, components.
A number of areas are consistently found regardless of the
method used, although some differences have been identified as
well. Areas consistently identified are the medial posterior cor-
tex, specifically posterior cingulate cortex (PCC; areas 23/31) and
often the precuneus, the medial frontal cortex (MFC; including
areas 24/10-m/32), and bilateral inferior parietal and posterior
temporal areas around the temporoparietal junction area (TPJ).
Apart from these core nodes, other areas that are often reported
to participate in the DMN are the hippocampal formation and
medial temporal lobe and areas along the lateral temporal cortex
extending toward the temporal pole.
In the human brain diffusion-weighted imaging has been used
to identify the cingulum bundle as an important white matter
tract mediating the functional connectivity between two of the
core hubs of the DMN, the posterior and anterior medial cor-
tices (van den Heuvel et al., 2008; Greicius et al., 2009). Indeed,
the areas of the DMN are generally heavily interconnected with
one another. It has been argued that some of these regions form
part of the “structural core” of the neocortex, consisting of nodes
linking all mainmajor structural modules of the brain (Hagmann
et al., 2008). Finally, based on a detailed analysis of the resting
state functional connectivity patterns it has been suggested that
the DMN comprises at least two subsystems, one including the
lateral temporal cortex, temporal pole, and dorsomedial frontal
cortex, and another one centered on the medial temporal lobe,
hippocampal formation, posterior inferior parietal lobule (IPL),
and ventral MFC (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010).
OVERLAP BETWEEN THE DEFAULT MODE NETWORK
AND SOCIAL BRAIN NETWORKS
One of the first studies to explore the relationship between the
DMN and the neural basis of social cognition was performed by
Schilbach and colleagues (Schilbach et al., 2008). They performed
a conjunction analysis on the data from 12 studies from their
lab, defining the DMN by looking for areas that correlated neg-
atively with the task-related regressors defined in these studies.
Their analysis revealed the left angular gyrus, the precuneus, and
the ventral anterior cingulate cortex. The authors then noted that
some of the activations were very similar to those observed in var-
ious aspects of social cognition from their lab and other groups,
including the involvement of the precuneus in social interactions
(Schilbach et al., 2006), the left angular gyrus/TPJ in differentiat-
ing between self and others (Vogeley and Fink, 2003), and anterior
cingulate in action monitoring in self and others (Amodio and
Frith, 2006). The authors proposed that the physiological “base-
line” of the human brain is linked to the psychological “baseline,”
the predisposition human beings have for social cognition as the
default mode of thought.
As outlined above, the DMN can also be identified, together
with other functional networks, in fMRI data collected at rest.
Recently, Smith and colleagues compared resting state networks
as defined by ICA with networks of brain areas showing con-
sistent co-activation during task performance using the acti-
vation maps of experiments included in the online BrainMap
database (www.brainmap.org). They showed close correspon-
dence between the networks described by independent compo-
nents in the resting state and networks of co-activating brain
regions during experiments (Smith et al., 2009). In a subse-
quent study they went on to use the meta-data associated with
each study in their meta-analysis to investigate the type of tasks
that commonly activate each network. A network highly remi-
niscent of the DMN, showing bilateral inferior parietal/TPJ, pre-
cuneus/posterior cingulate, and medial frontal activation (their
component 13, see also Figure 1A) loaded strongly and exclu-
sively on only one behavioral domain, that of social cognition
(Laird et al., 2011).
To further investigate the overlap between the DMN and the
activity during social cognition tasks, we performed an addi-
tional meta-analysis of fMRI studies using the BrainMap database
and performed likelihood estimations (Eickhoff et al., 2009)
of functional brain activity associated with rest and associated
with social cognition. The BrainMap database was queried on
Jan 30th, 2012, when the database contained 2177 papers, 83
paradigm classes, 40934 participants, 10330 experiments, and
FIGURE 1 | Overlap between the default mode network (DMN) and
areas activated by social cognition paradigms. (A) DMN as found using
model-free analysis of resting state fMRI data (Smith et al., 2009).
(B,C) Activation likelihood maps of activity during passive “rest” conditions
(B), social cognition (C) and theory of mind (D). (E,F) Conjunction maps of
rest and social cognition (E) and of rest and theory of mind (F).
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82135 locations. Focusing only on studies in healthy participants
(Subjects: Diagnosis is Normals), we performed three different
searches.
First, we defined the network of regions active during rest
by asking for activations during experiments were partici-
pants we instructed to remain passive (Conditions: Instruction is
Passive/Rest AND Subjects: Diagnosis is Normals), which yielded
485 papers, with 1648 of 2417 experiments matching criteria.
This analysis yielded foci in the posterior medial, anterior medial,
and lateral temporoparietal cortices (Figure 1B). This network of
regions is very similar to the DMN defined by ICA of resting state
data by Smith et al. (2009) as displayed in Figure 1A.
Second, we investigated activations related to the broad
domain of social cognition (Experiments: Behavioral Domain is
Cognition: Social Cognition AND Subjects: Diagnosis is Normals),
which yielded 52 papers, with 186 of 216 experiments match-
ing criteria. This analysis (Figure 1C) yielded results very similar
to those described above for the resting state, including medial
frontal, posterior cingulate, and lateral temporoparietal foci.
Although the activation maps of the rest and the social cogni-
tion studies seem generally very similar, lateral temporoparieal
activation seemed to be extending more dorsally during rest. In
contrast, social cognition tended to activate a larger extend of
medial frontal cortex. A conjunction between the DMN defined
in the first analysis and these social cognition foci (thresh-
olded >100 voxels) showed significant overlap in the anterior
(para)cingulate bilateral, left and right angular gyrus, left frontal
operculum, and the posterior cingulate extending into the pre-
cuneus (Figure 1E).
The domain of social cognition is of course rather broad, com-
prising processes such as obtaining, retrieving, and processing
information about the lifes, relationships, andmental states of the
self and others. A network of DMN areas, including TPJ andMFC
has been attributed a role in mentalizing or Theory of Mind, i.e.,
the ability to understand and manipulates the beliefs of others
(Hagmann et al., 2008). This faculty is argued to be particu-
larly well developed in humans as compared to other primates
(Saxe, 2006). Therefore, in a final analysis, we looked more specif-
ically at activations related to this domain of social cognition by
searching for activations related to theory of mind (Experiments:
Paradigm Class is Theory of Mind Task AND Subjects: Diagnosis
is Normals), which yielded 24 papers, with 99 of 124 experi-
ments matching criteria. Again, a similar network was noticeable
(Figure 1D), although to a lesser extent. A conjunction between
the DMN defined in the first analysis and the theory of mind net-
work (thresholded > 100 voxels) showed significant overlap in
the left angular gyrus and the posterior cingulate, again extending
into the precuneus (Figure 1F).
NODES OF THE DMN IN SOCIAL COGNITION
Having established that there is some global overlap between the
networks identified as the “DMN” and those active during certain
social cognitive tasks, we will now focus on the different nodes
of these networks in a bit more detail. We will concentrate on
the three nodes of the DMN most consistently reported: medial
frontal cortex, medial posterior cortex, and lateral temporopari-
etal areas.
Increased activity in the medial posterior cortex was one of the
first and most robust findings in the default mode literature. A
substantial number of studies refer to this locus as posterior cin-
gulate and precuneus. However, a recent study argued that only
the PCC, area 23/31, has a connectivity pattern reminiscent of
the DMN and that the precuneus, area 7-m, should therefore not
be considered part of the default mode (Margulies et al., 2009).
This study showed functional interactions in the resting state of
PCC with ventral and dorsal prefrontal regions, medial tempo-
ral cortex, and lateral inferior parietal and temporal cortex. In
the domain of social cognition, PCC has been attributed a role
in attributing mental states to others (Saxe and Powell, 2006).
Medial frontal regions belonging to the DMN have been less con-
sistently characterized, with foci having been reported ventrally
in the medial area 10 and dorsally in areas 32 and 24. However,
the precise organization of the human medial frontal cortex and
its similarity with the macaque MFC remains a topic of debate
(Beckmann et al., 2009). In contrast to the PCC, medial frontal
regions have been argued to have more generalized roles in social
cognition, beyond the specific attribution of mental states (Saxe,
2006). The ventral part of the medial frontal cortex is commonly
seen in tasks probing empathy and gray matter in this area cor-
relates with mentalizing abilities and social network size (Lewis
et al., 2011).
Apart from these medial areas, the most commonly identified
regions of the DMN are bilateral areas along the posterior IPL,
often extending into posterior superior temporal cortex. This area
includes a region that in the literature on the neural basis of social
cognition is often referred to as the TPJ. Indeed, it has been argued
that the TPJ is the area most associated with theory of mind tasks
or mentalizing (Saxe, 2006). However, the precise locus of this
“social TPJ” remains a topic of debate, complicating any compar-
ison of functional anatomies across domains. Indeed, there is an
ongoing debate on whether activations in the TPJ related to the-
ory of mind and those related to other cognitive processes, such
as attentional switching are in the same or different cortical areas
(Decety and Lamm, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Scholz et al., 2009).
We have recently performed two studies aimed at character-
izing the lateral parietal cortex and TPJ in the human brain.
We used a combination of techniques. First, we used diffusion
imaging, an MRI technique aimed at characterizing the white
matter pathways connecting areas of the brain (Johansen-Berg
and Rushworth, 2009), to parcellate these brain areas into subre-
gions based on their structural connectivity with the whole brain.
Second, we used resting state fMRI to investigate which larger cor-
tical networks the resulting regions are part of. In the first study,
we parcellated the human right lateral parietal cortex, focusing
specifically on comparing its general organization with that of
the macaque monkey (Mars et al., 2011). We showed a general
similarity in organization between the human and macaque pari-
etal cortex, with some differences in the strength of connections
with the prefrontal cortex. In this study, we subdivided the IPL
into five separate regions, organized into a posterior-to-anterior
arrangement. This organization was highly similar to that sug-
gested by previous cytoarchitectonic parcellations in the human
brain (Caspers et al., 2008) and showed general similarities to that
of the macaque IPL. In the second study, we focused on the right
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 189 | 3
Mars et al. The default mode network and social cognition
TPJ in the human brain, an area whose exact anatomical location
and connectivity have been poorly characterized. We parcellated
a large area of interest incorporating all the locations that have
been described as “TPJ” in the literature and separated it into
three components (Mars et al., in press). We reported a dorsal
area and two ventral regions. The dorsal area overlapped with the
IPL regions in our parietal study (Mars et al., 2011). Ventrally,
we identified two areas, one anterior (TPJa) and one posterior
(TPJp). We believe the posterior TPJ region overlaps with the foci
traditionally associated with social cognition.
In order to investigate which larger cortical network each of
the TPJ clusters participates in, we next investigated the resting
state functional connectivity of each of them. We observed that
the TPJp showed coupling with regions along the medial surface,
including posterior cingulate/precuneus and areas in the vicinity
of the anterior cingulate cortex/paracingulate gyrus. These areas
are strongly reminiscent of the DMN. To explore this issue, we
used ICA to identify the default mode in the same dataset and
plotted some of the regions identified in the parietal and TPJ
studies on the same brain. As can be seen in Figure 2, the bor-
der between the anterior and posterior ventral TPJ subdivisons
coincided with the extent of the DMN independent component.
Moreover, the DMN component overlapped with the most pos-
terior IPL subdivisions, the posterior and anterior parts of the
angular gyrus. In this respect, it is interesting to point out that
some posterior IPL regions might be similar to macaque area Opt,
which has strong connections to the PCC and the limbic system
(Caspers et al., 2011).
In summary, both at the level of the network and that of indi-
vidual brain areas there seems to be a consistent overlap between
the DMN and areas that are active during certain types of social
cognitive tasks, most notablymentalizing tasks. Although the pre-
cise anatomy of both the DMN and the social brain are only
partially mapped out, the core nodes of the DMNhave all received
tentative labels in terms of their contribution to social cognition.
The challenge for the future is to further identify and localize
these nodes and to determine tractable computations that each
area is performing.
DMN AND THE SOCIAL BRAIN IN NON-HUMAN PRIMATES
An exciting development which might prove beneficial to under-
standing the relationship between social cognition and the DMN
is that the DMN has now been reported in a number of non-
human primates. Vincent and colleagues showed that macaque
monkeys (Macaca mulatta andMacaca fascicularis) exhibit spon-
taneous brain activity similar to the human resting state while
being scanned under light anesthesia (Vincent et al., 2007). When
they seeded an area in the medial posterior cortex, probably
enclosing the posterior cingulate and parts of the precuneus, a
network consisting of posterior lateral and medial frontal activ-
ity emerged, similar to the human DMN. Following this result,
Kojima and colleagues used PET in awake monkeys to show task-
related deactivations in macaque medial cortical areas (Kojima
et al., 2009). Although some differences with the human DMN
were apparent their results provided further indication that mon-
keys have a DMN similar to that in the human brain. Building
on this work, Mantini and colleagues recently performed a meta-
analysis of 15 fMRI studies on awake macaques (Mantini et al.,
2011). Similar to the approach taken in Schilbach’s 2008 paper
on humans, they looked at areas of the brain that were active
FIGURE 2 | Overlap between connectivity-based subregions of the
inferior parietal lobule and temporoparietal junction area and the DMN.
Top: Overlap between resting state function connectivity of the posterior TPJ
as defined by Mars et al. (in press) in green and the DMN as defined using
independent component analysis in pink. Bottom: Overlap between the
DMN in pink and the anterior (TPJa) and posterior (TPJp) areas from Mars
et al. (in press) and the anterior and posterior angular gyrus from Mars et al.
(2011).
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during the rest periods as opposed to task blocks in these stud-
ies. The authors tentatively suggested that the macaque DMN
included areas in the medial and lateral prefrontal cortex, pos-
terior cingulate areas, and lateral inferior parietal and temporal-
occipital regions. The authors also noted the possible existence
of different subsystems within the macaque DMN, one con-
sisting of the temporo-parietal-occipital cortex, MFC, and area
8b, and one consisting of posterior cingulate and inferior pari-
etal areas. Beyond these results in macaques, suggestions of
brain activity associated with rest reminiscent of the human
DMN has also been reported in chimpanzees (Rilling et al.,
2007).
In light of these results showing that networks reminiscent of
the DMN can be found in primates other than humans, it is inter-
esting to establish if there is any relationship between the DMN
and areas involved in social cognition in these species. Research
into the neural basis of social cognition in non-human primates
has generated considerable interest recently, amongst others due
to the prominence of the so-called “social brain hypothesis”
(Dunbar, 1998). This hypothesis relates the relative size of the pri-
mate brain to challenges associated with living in complex social
groups. In order to test the hypothesis that it is the DMN that
mediates some of these animals’ social abilities, in would be nec-
essary to relate differences in DMN organization with differences
in social abilities between these species. Unfortunately, studies
comparing the neural basis of social abilities between species
remain rare (Rilling et al., 2012). Instead, some recent studies
have focused on the effects of sociality on brain size between
individuals of the same species.
Sallet et al. (2011) investigated whether there are areas in
the macaque (Macaca mulatta) brain that show structural differ-
ences in relationship to two factors describing the social life of
captive macaques: the number of animals they are housed with
and an animal’s position in the group’s social hierarchy. They
reported a network of regions, including the rostral prefrontal
cortex, amygdala, and anterior andmiddle superior temporal sul-
cus (STS), which showed increased gray matter when macaques
were housed with more animals. Some of these regions, includ-
ing rostral prefrontal cortex and inferior temporal cortex also
showed increased gray matter in animals that occupied a higher
position in the social hierarchy. The authors also acquired rest-
ing state fMRI in those animals. Using these data, we can look
at areas of the brain showing functional connectivity with the
areas showing gray matter differences related to social network
size. Using the mid-STS region as a seed this results in pos-
terior cingulate, anterior cingulate cortex, and lateral posterior
areas (Figure 3A). This network is very similar to Vincent’s DMN
in macaques, indicating that the overlap between the DMN
and brain areas involved in social cognition potentially extends
beyond the human brain.
We can then take this analysis a step further and see if
any of these functional correlations with mid-STS are modu-
lated by social network size. Sallet and colleagues did precisely
this, and reported increased functional coupling between mid-
STS and the anterior cingulate with increasing network size
(Sallet et al., 2011), suggesting that the anterior cingulate is pref-
erentially recruited into the DMN in participants with larger
social networks. Going even further, we can test this hypothesis
of increased involvement of the anterior cingulate cortex in
the DMN directly. Using the recently established technique of
dual-regression (Filippini et al., 2009) it is possible to test for indi-
vidual differences in recruitment of brain areas in any particular
resting state network. We used this technique on resting state data
obtained from 32 macaque monkeys including those in the study
of Sallet et al. (2011). From a group-ICA analysis, we selected the
component that best captured the DMN (Figure 3B) and asked
if there were any voxels in the brain that participate more in this
component in participants housed with an increasing number of
other animals. As can be seen in Figure 3C, the medial frontal
cortex is increasingly recruited in the DMN in these monkeys.
These results thus provide direct evidence that the DMN differs
in individuals as a function of social network size.
It is informative to discuss some of the similarities and dif-
ferences in the results obtained from humans and non-human
primates. At first glance, the results in human and monkeys are
very convergent. Both have a DMN consisting of medial frontal
and parietal cores and lateral temporoparietal areas. Moreover,
effects of sociality, operationalized by social network size and
mentalizing ability have been shown to correlate with gray matter
density in areas of the human brain (Bickart et al., 2011; Lewis
et al., 2011; Dunbar, 2012), similar to the results obtained in
macaques (Sallet et al., 2011). However, there are also differences,
both in the anatomy of the two brains and, of course, in the social
abilities of the two species (Passingham, 2008; Cheney, 2011).
Some of the most notable anatomical differences are in regions
reported in the gray matter density studies of social ability. For
instance, in their analysis of the macaque DMN Mantini et al.
(2011) noted that there is still uncertainty about the relationship
between the MFC in humans and macaques. Furthermore, activ-
ity around the TPJ is commonly reported in the human DMN,
but seed-based correlation analysis of the macaque DMN often
show slightly more ventral areas in posterior lateral STS, which
would be consistent with known connectivity of the macaque
PCC (Kobayashi and Amaral, 2003). Given the large relative
expansion of the middle parts of both the IPL and the STS in
the human as compared to the macaque brain (van Essen and
Dierker, 2007) some changes in relative position of these lateral
nodes of the DMN might be expected. This, however, remains to
be investigated in detail.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we have investigated evidence for overlap between
the DMN and areas involved in social cognition. We have shown
that both at the network level and at the level of individual
brain regions there is overlap between these two networks. We
have highlighted the fact that the precise anatomical loci of areas
involved in the DMN is not always known, particularly in the case
of the area around the TPJ. Finally, we have investigated whether
a similar relationship between brain areas involved in social skills
and the DMN might be apparent in non-human primates. In
what follows we will try to integrate these results and discuss their
implications.
It is not the intention of this paper to claim that the pur-
pose of the DMN is to “do” social cognition. Rather, the goal is
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FIGURE 3 | Social brain in the macaque? (A) Areas in the macaque
showing resting state functional connectivity with a region in the middle
superior temporal sulcus that, in turn, showed increases in gray matter
density in individuals living in larger social groups (data from Sallet et al.,
2011). (B) Group independent component capturing the default mode
network. (C) Dual regression results showing a region of the medial frontal
cortex (in blue) that in increasingly recruited into the DMN (in red) when
animals live in bigger groups.
to highlight the proposed overlap between the “social brain net-
work” and the DMN and to discuss the potential implications of
this, both with reference to the human and the wider primate
literature. Although a number of authors have tried to recast
social cognition in terms of underlying more basic processes,
this has proven notoriously difficult (Behrens et al., 2008). The
activity shown in areas commonly attributed to the DMN during
social cognition provides an interesting challenge to find a com-
mon computational function for these two seemly very different
functions and some studies are currently proposing frameworks
for addressing this issue (Sadaghiani et al., 2010; Yoshida et al.,
2010).
Studies trying to find order in the variety of processes that
might be present when participants are “at rest” appeared from
the beginning of the research into the DMN. Early studies already
noted that “rest” consisted of a variety of functions (Andreasen
et al., 1995), suggesting that rest might best be characterized as
“Random Episodic Silent Thinking” about one’s life and expe-
riences. Since then, more and more reports have emerged of
processes that seem to engage the DMN and there is a growing
number of proposals regarding what the common denominator
of these processes, is ranging frommind wandering (Mason et al.,
2007) to the sense of self (Qin and Northoff, 2011).
Buckner et al. (2008) categorized these different hypothe-
ses into two classes. The first class refers to hypotheses that
emphasize the fact that the DMN is active during situations in
which there is no strong task constraint, when participants are
allowed or even encouraged to broadly monitor the environ-
ment, in contrast to the narrow tunnel vision often associated
with psychological laboratory tasks. Consistent with this type of
proposal, Platt and colleagues have recently suggested a more
computationally constrained role of the posterior cingulate in
the detection of changes in the environment and subsequent
changes in decision policy and behavior (Pearson et al., 2011).
The second class of hypotheses focuses on the involvement of
the hippocampal and medial temporal structures in the DMN
and attributes it a role more in mentation. In other words, pro-
cesses which rely on episodic memory and mental simulations
are prone to rely on the DMN. These hypotheses are broadly con-
sistent with activity observed in the DMN during such processes
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as thinking about one’s future and constructing a mental rep-
resentation based on autobiographical memory (Spreng et al.,
2009; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010) and have also been cited as
an important reason for the involvement of the DMN in social
processes such as mentalizing. Both of these theories would be
consistent with a function of the DMN in social cognition. It has
been suggested that social cognition relies on processes that might
be distinct from other forms of intelligence. Indeed, this “social
function of intellect” hypothesis has been proposed repeatedly
(Jolly, 1966; Humphrey, 1976) and forms the basis of the “social
brain hypothesis” which states that our brains have expanded so
much over the course of evolution precisely because of the chal-
lenges involved in living in large social groups (Dunbar, 1998).
The ecology of social cognition might provide some clues as to
why the DMN might have properties that are beneficial to this
type of mental faculty. The largely unconstrained nature of social
decision making, including its reliance on potentially multiple
instances of recursive thinking might be one reason why social
cognition relies on a network such as the DMN. As noted above,
the DMN is characterized by the presence of a number of very
rich nodes, i.e., areas that form long-range connections to other
brain regions (Hagmann et al., 2008). Furthermore, it has been
argued that the core skill necessary to survive in our complex
social environments is the ability to keep track of the complex
and constantly changing social relationships, not only of one-
self with the other group members, but also between the other
group members among themselves (De Waal, 1982; Cheney and
Seyfarth, 2008). The presence of wide-range connections together
with the subsystem involving areas associated with autobiograph-
ical memory might make the DMN a logical system to employ in
social problem solving.
If it is true that higher-order social cognition relies at least
in part on the DMN in the human brain, the question is what
the finding of a similar network in chimpanzees and macaques
means. At the very least, a strong reliance of higher order social
cognition on an already existent neural basis would be consistent
with theories which propose that great apes, and by extension
the common precursor of great apes and humans, may have
(had) many of the relevant cognitive preconditions for uniquely
human social cognition to evolve. The “cooperative breeding
hypothesis” proposed by Hrdy and colleagues (Burkart et al.,
2009; Hrdy, 2009) suggests that it was the case, but that other
apes and our common ancestor lacked the motivational pre-
conditions that were required to developed full “human-style”
mentalizing. In their specific hypothesis, it was the evolution
of cooperative breeding, together with the existing ape-type
brain, that lead to our complex social abilities (Burkart et al.,
2009).
In conclusion, the overlap between the DMN and brain areas
involved in social cognition deserves further attention. Its pre-
cise anatomy and computational function still harbors many
unknowns, but their solution might have implications far beyond
the field of cognitive neuroscience.
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